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Abstract
The growing need for efficient and effective human
decision-makers warrants a better understanding of
how decision support systems (DSS) guide users to
improved decisions. Decision support approaches
utilize visual aids to assist decision-making, including
trade-off diagrams. These visualizations help
comprehension of key trade-offs among decision
alternatives. However, little is known about the role of
trade-off diagrams in human decision-making and the
best way to present them. Here, we discuss an
empirical study with two goals: 1) evaluating DSS
interactivity and 2) identifying decision-making
strategies with trade-off diagrams. We specifically
investigate the value of interface interactivity and
problem context as users make nine increasingly
complex decisions. Our results suggest that problem
context and interactivity separately influence ability to
navigate trade-off diagrams.

1. Introduction
In many domains the performance of decision
alternatives is evaluated on multiple objectives, which
often include inherent trade-offs. For example, a
policy maker may need to determine the optimal level
of tax, encouraging industries to emit less carbon but
curbing economic activity; a business manager may
need to determine how much inventory to stock, which
is costly to acquire but also provides an uncertain
potential for revenue. An understanding and
evaluation of these trade-offs is essential to make
effective and efficient decisions. Decision support
tools help to facilitate and assist these tasks. Typically,
decision support tools portray trade-off information
between multiple objectives in the form of trade-off
diagrams. Trade-off diagrams show the impact of a
change in each attribute on the overall performance of
a system as well as on other attributes (Fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Example of a trade-off diagram
showing alternative dominated (indigo) and
non-dominated (orange) strategies. Star
represents the theoretical ideal strategy.
Despite wide use of trade-off diagrams in the
environmental decision support design literature [1, 2,
3, 4], little is known about when and to what extent
they are effective. Specifically, the visual format of
these diagrams is meant to improve decision makers'
comprehension of the problem at hand. Nevertheless,
the complexity of trade-off diagrams increases with
the number of objectives. As a result, trade-offs
become harder to comprehend, even for experts.
Decision tools are typically contained in decision
support systems (DSS), characterized as “interactive
computer based systems, which help decision makers
utilize data and models to solve unstructured
problems” [5, p. 1]. The success of DSS is typically
measured through effectiveness (decision outcomes)
and efficiency (use of resources) [6]. While the design
of DSS has received attention in the literature, there is
scant information available for the net benefit of
incorporating trade-off diagrams in DSS. Accordingly,
this paper focuses on understanding the benefit of
using trade-off diagrams in DSS as decision aids,
when a decision maker faces a multi-attribute decision
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problem and seeks to navigate to a Pareto dominant
strategy (we define these terms shortly for clarity).
Here, we focus on two specific aspects of decision
support tools: interactivity and contextual details,
reporting on three main points on the relationship
between decision-making strategy and interactive DSS
using trade-off diagrams.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Pareto front for multi-objective decisions
In decision situations with multiple objectives,
more than one alternative provides most-preferred
performance, depending on preference among the
multiple objectives. For example, policy makers are
tasked with selecting energy policies to reduce carbon
emissions while generating economic activity. Policy
makers who value reducing carbon emissions will
prefer policies reducing carbon emissions dramatically
at the expense of economic activity, while policy
makers valuing economic activity will favor policies
that generate economic activity at the expense of
reducing carbon emissions. Assuming policy makers
have no motivations for selecting policies outside of
reducing carbon emissions and maximizing economic
productivity, no policy maker will prefer a policy with
little carbon emissions reduction and little economic
activity when alternatives exist with greater economic
activity and higher levels of carbon emissions
reduction.
Policies that can be updated to improve
performance in all objectives are said to be Pareto
dominated, while policies that cannot be updated to
improve performance with respect to one objective
without degrading performance in another objective
are said to be Pareto dominant (See Fig. 1 for an
illustration). The set of policies meeting Pareto
Dominance criteria are on a Pareto frontier or Pareto
Front [7]. The purpose of multi-objective decision
support tools is to help decision makers compare
candidate policies for selection in terms of multiple
objectives and identify the candidate that provides the
best performance given the preferences of the decision
maker. Specifically, an effective DSS enables decision
makers to reach the Pareto frontier and select an
alternative on this frontier that maximizes net utility
over multiple attributes. As will be clear in Section 3.2,
our experimental design focuses on measuring the
extent trade-off diagrams help decision makers reach
the Pareto frontier.

2.2. Challenges in decision approaches

Human decision-making faces a number of
challenges including characterizing the problem,
weighing alternatives, unfamiliarity of problem
objectives [8], trustworthiness of information [9], and
overreliance on unrelated or inappropriate models for
decision-making [10]. Such challenges couple with
reliance on approaches based on intuition or individual
values and beliefs [11].
Decision-making approaches rely on decision
makers to build mental models of the problem [11].
These mental models form from numerous sources
from one’s beliefs and values to experiences and
external stimuli [11]. Mental models present one of the
key distinctions between experts and novices in
decision-making, where experts draw on existing
models or schema to navigate a decision while novices
rely on other approaches such as intuition. The
differing approaches influence the direct strategy used
to make a decision. Trade-off diagrams explicitly
provide relationships between various problem
parameters and help decision makers develop clearer
mental models, leading to better decisions.
Choosing an approach to make a decision can be
influenced by the modality, format, quantity, and
complexity of information. As such, decision aids and
the presentation mode of information can influence
decisions [12]. Budescu et al. [2014], for example,
reports that decision makers using decision aids select
strategies that trade off imprecision and risk rather
than playing it safe. To be successful, decision aids
need to present information in ways that do not bias
the decision makers’ understanding or choice.

2.3. Characteristics of DSS
Decision aids come in many forms with the
general purpose of assisting with decision-making.
Grouping decision aids together with other types of
support forms a DSS. With a wide format of decision
aids available, DSS vary in what they do and how they
support decision makers [13]. Characteristics range
from the user to the type of problem. Such
characteristics lead to affording a user cognitively and
behaviorally when making decisions.
At the cognitive level, DSS reduce mental load
primarily through visualization by building on human
perceptual capabilities. In other words, it is easier for
a human to interpret a picture or graph than numbers
alone to make sense of information. Visualization
offers a visual perspective that includes users’ ability
to manipulate a visual representation and access a
large extent of details or context about the information
visualized [14]. Trade-off diagrams provide this visual
representation succinctly, and are likely to improve
decision makers’ performance.
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The response to the visual stimulus is often
behavioral. Where visual perspectives build on users’
inherent ability for visual sense-making, the response
may be manipulating the representation, interacting
with the system to improve the visual perspective.
While DSS offer a number of ways to perform actions,
extent of details or context information is highly
relevant for decision-making [14]. Interactivity with a
visualization system is inherently related to decisionmaking as it affords exploration of multiple
perspectives of problem data.

2.3. Interactivity
Trade-off diagrams are commonly presented as a
series of separate images breaking down multiobjective problems. DSS allow for interactive tradeoff diagrams where users manipulate not only input
parameters of the diagram but also the viewing
perspective. This ability to make changes to an aspect
of a DSS, such as the trade-off diagram, is an
affordance of the system. The affordance of
interactivity enables systematic access to specific
objectives in real-time, transforming, the degree of
agency (direct user control) provided to a decisionmaker [15]. The effect of interactivity is behavioral,
where users respond to feedback in real-time. In this
study, interactivity is the ability to make changes to the
trade-off diagram in real time through slider bars that
manipulates the graphs, but not viewing perspective.
The control for interactivity is a static trade-off
diagram represented by a series of example images
showing sample slider positions and the corresponding
tradeoffs rather than an interactive DSS. To help
isolate the effect of interactivity, we use a simplified
interface to allow more control over specific
affordances.

2.4. Contextual details
The depth and breadth of relatable information for
a problem’s context is part of a DSS. From a decisionmaking perspective, there is potential for one problem
context to be easier to navigate than another by
weighing pros and cons. Contextual details also
provide more tangible situations for decisions to be
made. However, this makes such systems less
externally valid across disciplines. Additionally,
contexts lead to preconceptions from existing mental
models to influence the approach or a provided model
can completely influence a decision [10]. A contextneutral option provides a simple way to determine the
role of context in understanding multiple objectives in
a problem. Context-neutrality provides insights into

how decision makers behave without any
preconceptions about the problem [12]. When faced
with a realistic problem, people often incorporate their
past experience or domain knowledge, biasing the
results in ways impossible to tell apart from the system
or problem influence. To sum, the net impact of the
presence of contextual details on decision quality is
not clearly established.

3. Theory and methods
3.1 Hypotheses
When faced with complex decisions, human
decision makers use heuristics. These heuristics are
based on mental models that decision makers construct
in response to information pertaining to the problem.
This information partly comes from interactivity as an
engaged process where a decision maker evaluates
specific alternatives and extrapolates the performance
of alternatives. It may also come from contextual
details enabling the decision maker to determine
attributes and their interrelationships. Therefore, a
stronger interactivity and contextual content in a DSS
leads to better performance. Accordingly, we propose:
H1: Decision makers’ performance will be influenced
by both interactivity and context.
Here, we focus on the interaction effect of
interactivity and context. Specifically, contextual
details enable decision makers to identify relevant
attributes and their directional relationships that feed
their mental model. Interactivity in a DSS enables
decision makers to ascertain the strength of
relationships between attributes. These two aspects are
complementary and accordingly, we propose both
have a positive impact on decision quality.
H2: A context and interactive interface will improve
comprehension of system dynamics.
In the absence of context, decision makers rely on
a purely mathematical understanding of a system,
restricting their ability to generate a potential solution.
A lack of interactivity is likely to have a similar
impact. Specifically, decision makers strongly anchor
their searches on solutions most salient in their recent
experience. In our study, when a DSS only provides
problem details in the form of specific scenarios,
decision makers exhibit restricted behavior in their
search for a solution.
H3: There will be a significant difference in number of
common strategies based on whether the interactive or
static interface is used.

3.2 Experiment design
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We designed the experiment to test the value of
trade-off diagrams for helping decision makers
navigate to a Pareto dominant strategy. In this section,
we describe the factorial design. In Section 3.3 we
describe the interface, and in Section 3.4 we describe
the problem context.
To test our hypotheses we use a 2 (interactivity) x
2 (context) experimental study with 4 treatments.
Interactivity splits into interactive and static.
Participants in the interactive condition experience
real time feedback from their manipulation of the
interface. The static condition provides participants
with a set of images portraying examples of what the
interactive interface would look like with sliders set to
a range of representative combinations. Context splits
into two groups based on problem framing, either
context or context-neutral. The rationale is to remove
undue influence of context on participants’
comprehension. Differences in the context condition
focus on labeling the problem: context presents an
established natural resource management problem and
the context-neutral condition presents the same
problem without labels.

In each treatment, participants face individual
versions of the problem, scaling the degree of
complexity by number of objectives and levers
(number of time periods controllable) through our
interface. The least complex problem has a single
objective and one lever while the most complex
problem has three objectives and three levers. Scaling
the problem into separate decisions allows for
examination of the interface and decision maker
performance iteratively. Figure 4 presents these 9
versions of the problem, which are also described in
more detail in Section 3.4.

3.3 Developing a decision support interface
The support tool interface focuses primarily on
trade-off diagrams. Developed through a combination
of Flask and Python , the web-interface allows for
user input through a set of sliders. Two main layouts
are used depending on the interactivity condition. The
interactive condition (Fig. 2 top), provides real-time
feedback in the trade-off diagram as participants alter
input values through the sliders.
©

©

Figure 2. (Top) Screenshot of interactive interface for three objective trade-off diagram (bottom)
Screenshot of static interface.
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The static condition (Fig. 2 bottom) provides six
different images of example strategies and
corresponding tradeoff diagrams. Users in the static
condition are not able to see the trade-off diagram
change in response as they adjust sliders. Each
example strategy specifies different slider positions
that generate specific trade-offs displayed on the
diagram in each image. These strategies are selected
randomly. These design features of the static and
dynamic conditions are consistent with the way policy
makers typically interact with DSS by looking at
vignettes or sample strategies and then making
decisions.

3.4. Context description
The problem description comes from an
established natural resources management problem
consisting of a lake, factory and a town [16, 1]. The
problem provides a context where decision-makers
navigate multiple objectives related to the release of
waste into the lake to generate economic benefits
while attempting to sustain high water quality and
minimize the chances of crossing an ecological tipping
point into an alternate, less desirable regime (Fig. 3).
The trade-off in this problem is that a high level of
waste discharge increases the financial benefit,
reduces water quality, and increases the chances of
crossing an ecological tipping point.

levers. The interface used in the treatments also made
this feature clear.

Figure 4. Context-neutral problem system
dynamics with simplified labels.
Table 1. Problem format at each decision
stage (context-neutral in parentheses).
Decision

Objectives

Factory waste discharge in
years 1-100 (Slider 1)

1

2

Maximize
economic
benefits (A)

3

6
Figure. 3. The lake problem system dynamics
adapted from [3] for the context condition.
7
A context-neutral version uses the same problem
and simulation model, removing contextual labels for
better comparison. Objectives are translated to letter
denominated variables (economic benefit turned into
A, water quality into B, and reliability into C) (Fig. 4).
Note that the normative Efficient Frontiers for these 9
scenarios are available through the data and analysis
in [16, 1]. The static and dynamic performances
displayed to the participants are based on these
normative data. The participants are tasked with
reaching as close as possible to these Efficient
Frontiers. We also note the problem descriptions in the
treatments are consistent with cardinal objectives and

8

9

Factory waste discharge in
years 1-49 (Slider 1)
50-100 (Slider 2)
Factory waste discharge in
years 1-33 (Slider 1)
34-66 (Slider 2)
67-100 (Slider 3)
Factory waste discharge in
years 1-100 (Slider 1)

4

5

Levers

Maximize
economic
benefits (A)
and water
quality (B)

Factory waste discharge in
years 1-49 (Slider 1)
50-100 (Slider 2)
Factory waste discharge in
years 1-33 (Slider 1)
34-66 (Slider 2)
67-100 (Slider 3)
Factory waste discharge in
years 1-100 (Slider 1)

Maximize
economic
Factory waste discharge in
benefits (A),
years 1-49 (Slider 1)
water quality
50-100 (Slider 2)
(B), and
Factory waste discharge in
reliability (C)
years 1-33 (Slider 1)
34-66 (Slider 2)
67-100 (Slider 3)

3.5. Experiment protocol
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The experiment follows the protocol below.
Participants enter a computer lab and occupy seats
randomly. Each seat has an assigned identification
number indicating which treatment a participant will
complete. Entering the number into the interface opens
an initial demographics survey followed by
instructions about the assigned treatment through a
short video tutorial.
Next, each participant provides responses to nine
decision-making scenarios (Table 1). The scenarios
are based on the same underlying problem, but vary by
number of decision objectives in increasing order (one
objective series, two objective series, and three
objective series). Within each series, the decisions
vary by number of levers, also in the same order (one
lever, two levers, then three levers). Users have five
minutes to make each decision. In order to ensure
participants do not rush through the experiment, they
can provide a response only after one minute per
scenario.
After submitting the ninth decision, participants
answer a series of questions designed to assess their
decision-making process. Participants receive a cash
reward based on their average set of decisions with a
minimum of $7 and a maximum up to $17. The cash
reward is based on the average percentage distance
between each strategy selected by that participant and
the Pareto front in the nine scenarios. A total of N =
142 are in the study, with an average payment of $16.

To understand the relative importance assigned to
objectives in reaching a decision, we determine a
Preference Score. Like Pareto score, the preference
score is a metric normalized relative to the preferences
demonstrated by a set of randomly generated
“reference” strategies ranging from 0 to 1 in value.
Preference score is designed to compare strategies’
outcome in terms of the demonstrated values of
objectives in tension in a format that is comparable
among versions of the same decision problem
formulated with different numbers of levers. In this
problem, Economic benefits (“A”) is in tension with
both Water Quality (“B”) and Reliability (“C”), which
are aligned. Because the Water Quality metric and
Reliability metric are aligned, there is very little
difference between the Economic benefits-Water
Quality preference score and the Economic benefitsReliability preference score of any given strategy. In
this paper, an Economic Benefits versus Water Quality
objective is reported.
Lastly, six multiple-choice questions provide an
assessment for whether participants understood the
underlying dynamics of the lake/context-neutral
problem. These questions inquire about the
relationships between the levers and different
objectives of the problem; correct or incorrect answers
by a participant reveal understanding of the underlying
relationship between each objective. These questions
average into an overall comprehension score based on
the number of correct responses across these
questions.

3.6. Measures

4. Analysis
To investigate both decision-making strategy and
interactivity, we use several measures.
We develop a metric called “Pareto score” to
quantify participants’ skill in selecting a strategy near
the Pareto frontier in a form comparable among
different versions of the decision problem. Pareto
score is calculated by comparing the Euclidean
distance between a user’s selected strategy and the
Pareto front relative to a group of randomly generated
strategies (“reference strategies”). Pareto score is the
fraction of randomly generated strategies further from
the Pareto front than the strategy under consideration.
A score of “1” represents a strategy that is closer to the
Pareto front than all randomly generated reference
strategies, and a score of “0” represents a strategy
further from the Pareto front than all of the reference
strategies. This score also diagnoses if a participant’s
responses are likely to be randomly selected due to
inattention or due to decision complexity. Because
decisions made using only one lever are by definition
on the Pareto front, Pareto scores are not reported for
one-lever, multi-objective decisions (D4 and D7).

4.1. Participants
Participants (N = 142) range in age from 22-44 (M
= 21.63) with 54 males and 88 females. The sample
consists of a number of different academic
backgrounds.

4.2. Testing the first hypothesis
We ran a two-way MANOVA with our two
conditions on the two and three lever Pareto Scores, a
total of six independent scores. The results indicate
interactivity (Wilks ƛ = 0.81, F (6,124) = 4.97, p =
0.00, partial η2 = 0.19), and context (Wilks ƛ = 0.85,
F (6,124) = 3.75, p = 0.00, partial η2 = 0.15) affect the
set of Pareto Scores individually. We find no
statistically significant interaction effect between
interactivity and context: Wilks ƛ = 0.96, F (6,124) =
0.77, p = 0.59, partial η2 = 0.04. These results suggest
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we partially accept H1 as our conditions influence
Pareto Scores independently, not together.
Follow-up univariate analysis (Table 2) shows
interactivity is statistically significantly correlated
with Pareto Scores at a subset of decision scenarios
(D2, D3, D5, and D8).
Table 2. Follow-up summary of ANOVA
analysis for interactivity.
Decisions
D2

df

MS

1

F

p

0.20 5.75

0.02*
0.04*

partial
η2

1

0.13 4.22

D5

1

1.20 16.31 0.00** 0.11

D8

1

0.68 11.57 0.00** 0.08

Error

129

0.03

Note. - * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001
Pareto scores within the interactive condition are
statistically significantly higher than scores in the
static condition except in the three-objective decision
8 (D8) (Figure 4, p < 0.05).
Table 3. Mean differences on Pareto Score by
interactivity condition.
Condition

M

Table 4. Follow-up summary of ANOVA
analysis for context.
Decisions

df

MS

F

partial
η2

p

D2

1

0.66 19.01 0.00** 0.13

D3

1

0.37 12.07 0.00** 0.09

D8

1

0.21 3.60

Error

129

0.04

D3

Decisions

Follow-up univariate analysis (Table 4) reveals
statistically significant relationships between context
and Pareto Scores at a subset of decision scenarios
(D2, D3). There is a near significance for D8.

Std. Error

interactive

0.89

0.02

static

0.81

0.02

0.06

0.03

Note. - * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001
In both significant cases, Pareto scores are
generally higher in the context-neutral condition than
the lake condition (Table 5). In the near significant
case, strategies in the context-neutral condition (M =
0.54, SE = 0.03) also outperformed the lake condition
(M = 0.46, SE = 0.03).
Table 5. Mean differences on Pareto Score by
context condition.
Decisions

Condition

M

Std. Error

interactive

0.78

0.02

static

0.92

0.02

interactive

0.82

0.02

static

0.93

0.02

D2

D2
D3
interactive

0.91

0.02

static

0.84

0.02

interactive

0.74

0.03

static

0.55

0.03

interactive

0.43

0.03

static

0.57

0.04

D3

D5

D8

4.3. Testing the second hypothesis
We use a two-way ANOVA with the two
conditions to assess variation in comprehension score
between and among groups. There is no significant
interaction effect between interaction and context on
system dynamics comprehension: F (1,135) = 0.31, p
= 0.58, partial η2 = 0.00. Context is the most important
factor explaining comprehension of system dynamics:
F (1, 135) = 120.80, p = 0.00, partial η2 = 047. The
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lake context (M = 0.59 SE = 0.02) improves
comprehension better than context-neutral (M = 0.28
SE = 0.02). Based on this finding, we reject H2 as
interactivity has no significant influence on
comprehension of system dynamics.

objective decisions. LP-I: lake problem,
interactive condition. LP-S: lake problem,
static condition. NP-I: neutral problem,
interactive condition. NP-S: neutral problem,
static condition.

4.4 Testing the third hypothesis

5. Discussion

The type of strategy selected by each group is
measured through preference score. KolmogorovSmirnov tests compare the distributions of preference
scores at each decision stage and each betweensubjects context group to the corresponding group in
the other interactivity condition. For example, the
preference score selected by the context-neutral
interactive group is compared with the preference
scores of strategies by the context-neutral static group.
All pairwise comparisons between groups at the twoobjective decision stages (decisions 4, 5, and 6)
indicate statistically significant distributions of
preference score (p < 0.01) between interactive and
static conditions (Fig. 5).
Statistically
significant
preference
score
difference also exists in the context group at decision
2 (p < 0.01), the context group at decision 3 (p < 0.05),
and the context group at decisions 7 and 8 (p < 0.01).
Two-objective strategies selected by the interactive
groups favor the Water Quality/B objective more often
than strategies selected by static groups (Fig. 5). Based
on these findings, we partially accept H3s.

While it seems intuitive that users in the
interactive condition would perform better, as they
could more fully explore the dynamics of the system
through the trade-off diagrams, this was not always the
case. We speculate that participants in the static
condition are forced to create a more complete mental
model of the system in order to formulate an approach,
since they could not employ a strategy of manipulating
the levers more or less randomly until they found a
satisfactory decision. Alternatively, participants in the
static condition may have chosen to emulate one of the
provided examples if they are able to recognize that a
particular example strategy is high quality. This
approach may have created a more straightforward
pathway toward the Pareto front than interactive
manipulation.
Interestingly, decision effectiveness is not related
to any joint influence from context or interactivity.
This supports the notion that context pertains to the
cognitive affordance of the visualized trade-off
diagrams while interactivity is the behavioral
component. This finding also suggests that underlying
mental models of the trade-off diagrams are not
strengthened through a combination of afforded
interaction and relatable context. Rather, decision
effectiveness is based on either interactivity or context
individually, a departure from the idea that both
aspects make up the visual perspective [14]. In the
most complex scenario we found no statistically
significant relationship between performance and
either condition, suggesting there may a threshold in
decision complexity beyond which trade-off diagrams
alone are no longer sufficient to assist decisionmaking.
However, the hypothesis that having a context
would enable a better understanding of the problem is
supported, as participants in the context condition
show a clearer understanding of system dynamics.
Lastly, the hypothesis the number of common
strategies will differ between interactive and static
conditions is supported though the difference was not
statistically significant at all decision stages. The
difference is demonstrated most clearly by comparing
preference scores at the two-objective decision
scenarios, where most members of the interactive
group chose similar strategies while the static

Figure 5. Comparison of preference scores
demonstrated through selection of two-
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condition chose strategies that demonstrated more
widely dispersed preferences. This may indicate that
participants in the interactive condition are motivated
by the threshold in the system dynamics, which they
are able to identify by experimentally adjusting the
levers. This threshold is not evident in the singleobjective version of the problem, and would have been
evident but potentially more difficult to navigate in the
three-objective version of the problem. Participants in
the static conditions might not have recognized the
threshold in the second-objective performance, or may
have based their strategies on the examples given
which span a range of preferences. This suggests the
particular system dynamics native to a decision
problem may influence users’ interactivity-driven
decision-making strategy.

6. Implications
Our findings have implications for the design of
efficient DSS using trade-off diagrams. First,
contextual information in the trade-off diagrams
significantly increases decision quality. In many
situations contextual knowledge may be complex and
or difficult to express. Our findings suggest the benefit
of providing these details is likely to be worth the
effort. Interactivity also improves decision quality,
albeit to a lesser extent. Second, the lack of evidence
for interactive influence of interactivity and context on
decision quality implies these two features of a DSS
are substitutes. In light of the first implication, this
substitutability implies that in the presence of limited
resources, it may be prudent to first add context to the
decision-diagrams, and then, resources permitting, one
should add other features such as interactivity. Finally,
the benefit of trade-off diagrams decreases with
problem complexity. As a result no one-catch-all
approach can be used to guide the design of DSS. For
complex and large scale decision problems, careful
studies for the efficiency of specific support tools,
either individually or simultaneously, are warranted.

7. Conclusion and outlook
In domains where decisions are based on a
number of objectives, decision-makers need to be able
to understand and address trade-offs. DSS assist
decision-makers through various decision aids and
formats
of
presenting
information.
These
characteristics lead to affordances that can impact the
mental models of decision makers. Specifically, these
characteristics influence not only the approach to
reach a decision but the actual strategy used to reach a
specific outcome.

To examine the effectiveness of DSS for assisting
decision makers in multi-objective problems, we pose
a larger question asking how affordances of DSS can
help decision-makers navigate to a Pareto-dominant
strategy. We focus our study on one common visual
method, trade-off diagrams, to distill its role in
assisting with decision-making. We identify a
cognitive (context) and a behavioral (interactivity)
aspect of visualization to identify the effectiveness of
trade-off diagrams in a problem that become
increasingly complex. We find that trade-off diagrams
alone are sufficient for problems with fewer
objectives. However, as problem complexity
increases, trade-off diagrams no longer support
decision-making effectively.
This pilot study provides the opportunity to not
only explore trade-off diagrams further, but also to
examine the role of other visualization methods used
in a DSS. Limitations of the study include the limited
interaction capabilities of our DSS meant to provide a
focused look at a specific aspect found in most DSS.
Follow-ups to this study will further investigate the
role of context and interactivity in the formation of
mental models that lead to decision-maker approaches
through more complex DSS interfaces.
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